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Simeone 1
Introduction
Early modern Europe was a landscape of unprecedented scientific and philosophical
discovery, as thinkers across the continent were redefining what it meant to study the natural
world and themselves. The human body was at the forefront of this discovery and redefinition.
This was largely due to the early science of anatomy and dissection, which underwent profound
growth in the early modern period and began to “transform entirely people’s understanding … of
themselves and their sense of identity or ‘selfhood,’” as cultural historian Jonathan Sawday puts
it (Body viii). Once human dissection and the intensive study of the body became standard in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, long-held convictions about humans’ embodiment were
shaken. This is because early modern knowledge production had long been bound by theology
and cosmology, and thus did not “admit the possibility of thinking about the body as a discrete
entity” (Sawday 16). Instead, any analysis of the body needed to be informed by an analysis of
the much more exalted thinking entity of the human—the rational soul, or, the mind. However,
dissection changed this, and anatomists across Europe began to see the body as a site of value in
and of itself for discovery about nature, God, and the self.
The seventeenth century is an especially fascinating period in which to study this
process—interest in human anatomy had already been increasing greatly since the early sixteenth
century and the publication of landmark anatomical texts as well as the construction of Europe’s
first anatomy theaters—places of public dissection—in the late sixteenth century (Principe
99-100). Thinkers in the early part of the century had to navigate a kind of pivotal period
straddling older, more holistic understandings of the body, and emerging models which
increasingly extracted the body from its ties to the Heavens, the soul, and the self. By the late
seventeenth century, the dominant philosophies of famous French philosopher René Descartes

Simeone 2
(1596-1650) had solidified this extraction—accepted thought no longer looked to our
embodiment as a critical component of what defines the human, instead focusing on the
immaterial thinking faculty of the mind. So, the mid-seventeenth century is arguably
well-defined as a period of overlap and transition between a culture which explored the body as a
distinct window into the wonder of humanity, and the gradual turn towards a culture that framed
the body as entirely distinct from the mind and as ultimately insignificant to defining the self and
what it means to be human. This project traces the implications of this gradual arc towards
Cartesian ideas in the later part of the century through two seventeenth century fictions: Phineas
Fletcher (1582-1650)’s The Purple Island (1633) and Gabriel Daniel (1649-1728)’s Voyage du
Monde de Descartes (1690). This project views these two largely-overlooked texts as important
literary works that represent the seventeenth century’s transformative debates about and
explorations of the human body.
Poets, fiction writers, and satirists intervened in the production of early modern
anatomical and natural philosophical knowledge which negotiated and shaped these
transformations. Phineas Fletcher wrote during the pivotal mid-century point when anatomical
science experiments and demonstrations were seen as facilitating crucial self-knowledge, and his
work benefited from the principles of anatomical discovery to shape his literary exploration of
the body. The key requirements of early modern experimental anatomical science—observation
and demonstration—were imitated by numerous literary anatomies. Figures such as English
poets Edmund Spenser (1552-1599) and John Donne (1572-1631) wrote famous poetic
works—The Faerie Queene (1590) and Of the Progress of the Soul (1612) respectively—which
explored nascent anatomical principles imaginatively, traveling into the body’s interior through
poetry. Fletcher’s The Purple Island exemplifies this possibility of literary anatomical
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experiment. Phineas Fletcher was an English poet and theologian whose work included religious
prose, drama, hymns, psalms, and pastoral, devotional, and epic poetry. His magnum opus, The
Purple Island, is a twelve-canto poem blending epic, pastoral, and utopic genres and describing
in allegory the physiological structure of the human body and mind, where the human body
becomes a fictional island. His poem embraces the possibilities of anatomical discovery,
celebrating the body as a conduit for self-knowledge, while at the same time anticipating the
century’s turn toward the singular elevation of the mind.
Gabriel Daniel’s Voyage du Monde de Descartes (1690)—published in English as A
Voyage to the World of Cartesius in 1692—writes decades after this turn, and provides a window
into the anxieties that facilitated it. Gabriel Daniel was a French Jesuit theologian, historian, and
occasional satirist who gained fame during his lifetime as the historiographer of France,
appointed by Louis XIV (Smith 792). Daniel’s Voyage to the World of Cartesius is a satirical
travel fiction aimed in part at critiquing the anatomical beliefs held by Descartes, which had
become dominant by 1692. Voyage attempts to do this by imagining a world where Cartesian
philosophies on the mind and body are fully realized in fantastical and exaggerated ways.
The legacies of these two works are not very significant—Purple Island has mostly been
viewed as a cumbersome mess of painstaking allegory, and Voyage did not manage to do any real
damage to Descartes’s legacy. However, this project will attempt to show that these two texts
deserve to be read in detail and read together as important contributions to the transformative
early modern culture of anatomy and philosophies of the body. Both texts represent the
convergence of the emerging science of anatomy, changing philosophies about the body and
mind, and imaginative fiction in the seventeenth century. In addition, both texts embody the
changing notions of self-discovery and the human in the seventeenth century.
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In Chapter One, I explore how The Purple Island embodies the mid-century period
between when anatomy encouraged people to learn about themselves through the body and the
late-century shift when, thanks in large part to Descartes, the body is no longer seen as a
meaningful location of the self. I argue that Fletcher employs a dissective mode that continually
reminds the reader of the mind’s embodiment, and that in doing so, the poem represents a pivotal
moment when the culture of dissection accomplished a dual anatomy where humans could
understand themselves as both fragmented and whole. This is because The Purple Island does
not ultimately reduce the human to parts, but instead paradoxically demonstrates the unity of
mind and body by studying it as a dissected, partitioned thing. In Chapter Two, I explore how A
Voyage to the World of Cartesius responds to an altogether different culture in the late
seventeenth century, within which the soul/mind became so thoroughly “dissected” from the
body that the body was no longer seen as being relevant for selfhood. I argue that Gabriel
Daniel’s Voyage ultimately reveals—through a captivating satirical fiction—how understanding
Cartesian anatomy as the product of anxiety, uncertainty, and novelty helps us better see how we
became motivated to transcend our bodies and the mechanistic view of ourselves. These
reflections culminate in an epilogue section that asks what we may be able to learn from these
early modern discourses about the body and mind in our age of artificial intelligence.
It is worth saying a bit more about the significance of Voyage and Purple Island as
fictional works that intervene in anatomical and philosophical knowledge of the body. Firstly,
both Purple Island and Voyage are travel fictions. As Jonathan Sawday tells us, the natural
philosophers of the earlier seventeenth century, “as they embarked upon the project of
unravelling the body’s recesses …, found themselves wandering within an (as yet) undiscovered”
territory (23). Fletcher’s decision to turn the body into an undiscovered fictional island helps to
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solidify his project as one dedicated to self-knowledge, and to exploring the undiscovered self
via the body. On the other hand, Daniel writes at the end of the seventeenth century, when the
body had been thoroughly explored and dissected; fittingly, then, he takes us to an entirely
fictional world that indirectly represents the anxieties and tensions that these explorations had
engendered. The two texts’ status as travel fictions helps to place them within the seventeenth
century’s period of overlap mentioned earlier—it is fitting that Fletcher’s fictional island is
undiscovered, since in 1633 anatomy was in some ways a still-emerging science; on the other
hand, it makes sense that Voyage’s world is an interpretation of a world that already exists
(Descartes’s), since by 1692, the fully-emerged culture of anatomy began to draw new
lines—particularly, lines bisecting the human, and separating our minds from our bodies.
Ultimately, both Fletcher and Daniel employ imaginative, literary tools to intervene in the
seventeenth century’s philosophical and anatomical debates about the body-mind relationship
and the body’s relationship to selfhood. As we will see, with Purple Island, Fletcher’s dissective
mode takes us into the body’s interior in ways that the real practice of anatomical science could
only come close to. In The Body Emblazoned (1995), Jonathan Sawday explains that “the sense
of interiority is inescapably central to the experience of the body within history. Yet, a feature of
our sense of interiority is that it can never be experienced other than at second-hand. We may
look into other bodies, but very rarely are we allowed to pry into our own” (7). Though Purple
Island’s “dissected” allegorical body does not possess marks of individuality, because Fletcher
frames the poem as a work of “autology”—meaning, as I will explain, a work capable of
transmitting new self-knowledge to each of its readers—the poem does seem to provide, for the
reader, the illusion of the dissected self, or, of the interior of each individual reader’s body. In
this way, Fletcher’s use of fiction to create his anatomy is what allows Purple Island to intervene
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in anatomical discovery, as it enables the reader to “peer” into the body’s interior in the name of
self-knowledge, a form of knowledge normally beyond the reach or outside the bounds of
dissection. Daniel’s fictional satire in Voyage also allows his text to go beyond the bounds of
physical anatomical discovery or real ways of exploring convictions about the body and mind.
Just over twenty years before the publication of Voyage, English natural philosopher Margaret
Cavendish wrote the following in her preface to her famous science fiction, The Blazing World
(1666): “the reason why I added this piece of fancy to my philosophical observations [was] … to
delight the reader with variety, which is always pleasing” (124). Similarly, in the opening pages
of Voyage, Daniel explains that his fiction is an attempt to “diversify and enliven a Subject
naturally dry and melancholy”—philosophy (x). Both Voyage and Purple Island join a tradition
of early modern fictions that sought to animate philosophical and scientific ideas and imbue them
with imaginative life. Ultimately, this animating power of fiction is what enables Fletcher and
Daniel to make their mark on the history of ideas about body, mind, and selfhood.
It is worth noting that Voyage’s particular status as a satirical fiction contributes to the
impact of Daniel’s fiction—specifically, it helps him frame Cartesianism as a contrived and
anxiously maintained fantasy, as Chapter Two will show. Notably, Voyage joins an important
historical network of satirical science fiction—in his preface, Daniel names Greek satirist Lucian
of Samosata (AD 125?-200?), author of A True Story, which is regarded by many as the earliest
known work of science fiction. A True Story is also considered to be the source of the science
fiction voyage/travel genre, which influenced numerous famous works including French writer
Cyrano de Bergerac (1619-1655)’s The Comical History of the States and Empires of the Moon
(1657), and Cavendish’s Blazing World, only a few decades before Daniel’s contribution to the
genre with Voyage. Just like these works that preceded it, Voyage contains no shortage of
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absurdities and fantastical scenarios. Though, as I will discuss, Daniel sees Voyage as in part a
serious work, the second chapter will show how the text’s distinctively satirical moments create
the consequential framing of Cartesian anatomy as a contrived fantasy. The fact that Daniel’s
satire imagines Cartesian notions of the body as part of a contrived fantasy perfectly situates it at
the end of the seventeenth-century arc of ideas about the body. While Fletcher’s literary,
disective mode allows him to create an anatomy of the body that reinforces body-mind harmony
at a pivotal moment in time when this harmony was under scrutiny, Daniel’s satire allows him to
reveal the anxieties underlying the Cartesian views which dominated after the pivot and long
after—views that attempted to create a new anatomy of the human that broke previous harmony,
shunned embodiment, and dislodged our selves from our bodies.
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Chapter One: The Anatomy of Embodiment in The Purple Island
Phineas Fletcher’s 1633 poem The Purple Island, Or The Isle of Man offers a unique and
expansive view into the early modern pursuit of self-knowledge. The poem—a twelve-canto
theological work blending epic, pastoral, and utopic genres—uses allegory to describe the
physiological structure of the human body, which it imagines as a fictional island. While Fletcher
was not the only early modern poet to “look to anatomy for poetic invention,” The Purple Island
has been cited by some, such as Renaissance scholar Peter Mitchell, as the most “persistent
poetic anatomy of the period,” exceeding any other comparable English text of the period in
describing the details of the body’s anatomy according to the emerging anatomical science of the
time (Mitchell 18). What sets Fletcher’s Purple Island apart, other than its scale, is its direct
employment of medical discourses of anatomy beyond those found in the works of Spenser or
Donne, thus shifting “from the language of poetry shaping science to the language of science
shaping poetry,” as scholar Thomas Healy puts it in a 1991 essay on the poem (Healy 342). The
Purple Island blurs lines delineating the often-distinct perspectives of poetry and anatomy as
well as theology and dissection. In doing so, Fletcher crafts a vast and complicated world that
straddles boundaries between old and new ideas about the body and mind, just before
transformative body-mind narratives appeared in the late seventeenth century.
Over many years, early modern philosophical thought slowly severed the body from the
mind, destabilizing a centuries-old view of the body and mind as inextricably linked. By the late
seventeenth century, the Cartesian notion that the mind and body are entirely distinct and
separable—introduced just four years after Purple Island’s publication with Descartes’
Discourse on Method (1637) and later expanded on in Meditations (1641)—had become
dominant; with its dominance, the self along with the significance of being human became
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located entirely in the mind. In both philosophy and literature, the remarkability of the body is
often overshadowed by the brilliance of the mind, and The Purple Island appears to be an
attempt to complicate this relationship. What is significant about the poem’s particular attempt is
that it came in the midst of transformations in the early modern period when the body first began
to be treated as a discrete entity—worthy of exploration on its own (detached from its
correspondences with the soul and the heavens), such as on the dissection tables of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. In other words, Fletcher’s Purple Island registers the philosophical
transformations of this transitional period before Cartesian philosophy established the view of
the body as not only discrete but actually discardable in a search for meaning and the self.
A close reading of Purple Island reveals that Fletcher simultaneously adapts to and
wrestles with the period’s emerging view of the body as a discrete entity: on one hand, he
engages in the period’s “culture of dissection,”1 writing a poem that appears to value partitioning
the world and body into parts and becoming a pseudo-anatomist as his stanzas “cut into” and
divide up the body in a persistent, systematic way. On the other hand, the poem consistently
emphasizes older models that pictured the body more as existing in a unified, harmonious whole
with the universe and heavenly correspondences. In this way, the poem becomes an important
embodiment of the struggle between old and emerging ideas about the body in early modern
Europe. It is significant that Fletcher, a theologian, becomes a pseudo-anatomist in his authorship
of the poem, because he is writing amidst an emerging philosophical and scientific climate that
began to study the body as a discrete entity, not necessarily binding its analysis to an analysis of
the cosmos, Heaven, and the soul/the mind. Importantly, however, the anatomic seat of the

1

“Culture of dissection” is a phrase borrowed from cultural historian Jonathan Sawday, who uses it to suggest “a
network of practices, social structures, and rituals surrounding [the] production of fragmented bodies” in the
European Renaissance (2). This culture was devoted to the “gathering of information and the dissemination of
knowledge of the ‘mystery’ of the human body” (5).
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human soul was a long-standing and controversial topic of discussion for natural philosophers
and theologians as far back as antiquity and throughout the early modern period. Though
dissection began to treat the body as discrete, there remained a significant motivation to develop
an anatomical science that marked out bodily structures that facilitate thought and reason. As
neuroscience historian Francisco López-Muñoz and coauthors point out in a 2011 essay, “for
[the] harmonious relationship between the mind and body to be successful, it was necessary for
the human soul to have a physical and corporeal seat from where it would carry out that
mysterious communication” (López-Muñoz et al., 166). Ultimately, in Purple Island, Fletcher
opens up and displays that seat.
Importantly, Fletcher’s dissective venture into the corporeal seat of the soul/the
immaterial mind is markedly different from how Cartesian philosophy would later describe this
aspect of the body. Drawing heavily on work by Galen, physician and philosopher of the Roman
Empire, Descartes established the soul in the innermost part of the brain, or, the pineal gland
(López-Muñoz et al., 166). In his model, the soul directs the human body from its seat in the
pineal gland; the image is one of a kind of human machine springing to life through the
mechanics of the soul’s signaling. Though Purple Island does include sections that similarly
describe the choroid plexus and other parts of the brain described by medieval and early modern
anatomists—including Italian anatomist Berengario da Carpi (1460-1530) and Belgian anatomist
Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564)—as the origin sites of motion, sensation, and human thought, the
poem uses its dissective exploration to take us into a whole other world besides the anatomical
one. For instance, in the fifth canto, which is dedicated to the head and brain, the poem’s narrator
describes the choroid plexus as the mainspring of the animal spirits—considered by many early
modern anatomists to be the instruments of the soul. The narrator’s account of the choroid plexus
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undergoes an allegorical transformation as the stanzas explain that a “hundred nimble workmen
stand, / These noble spirits readily preparing … / With never ended work, / and sleeplesse
caring” (5.15.1-4). Here, what Descartes would later describe in more mechanical terms is
elevated—the choroid plexus’s “workmen” are themselves agents, laboring on behalf of the
animal spirits of the soul; arguably, they present an image of a much more active body than the
Cartesian human machine which is essentially useless until it is animated into being and
importance by the spirits.
I argue that the most important way in which Fletcher’s description of the
body-soul/body-mind relationship sets itself apart from Platonic, Cartesian, and other traditions
is by cutting into and opening up even the most immaterial aspects of the human mind, despite
its periodical (and more conformist) insistence that these elements are profoundly
incomprehensible. Importantly, the poem’s descriptions of anatomical parts like the choroid
plexus do not ultimately participate deeply or integrally in the overall allegory of the poem. What
do appear more integral for Fletcher, are the poem’s six cantos dedicated mostly to meeting the
personified faculties of the mind as well as the Christian virtues and sins. Before the sixth canto,
the poem’s narrator had not ventured to open up the truly immaterial elements of the human to
our view; even in the above description of the spirits, the narrator tells us that these these spirits
are made of matter “almost immateriall” (5.14.5-6). So, when we get to these later six cantos, the
poem’s dissective mode engages with a much more surprising and metaphysical body-mind
exploration than the descriptions of the choroid plexus and its corporeal service to the soul. In
other words, the poem fully embraces the mind’s immateriality through, paradoxically, a
systematic investigation of personified mental faculties that is inspired by dissection, a method
meant for exploration of the physical, material body. By doing this, Fletcher embraces the body
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as a conduit to crucial knowledge even of the immaterial, ultimately superior mind. With
Fletcher’s poem, we can vividly imagine faculties such as the personified Will or Conscience as
counselors sitting in the Prince (the mind)’s court. Soon after Purple Island’s publication,
Descartes would insist that the immaterial mind is entirely distinct from the body, but Fletcher’s
poem firmly houses the mind’s most immaterial components in the body, and as the poem’s
narrator explores these components using a kind of dissective mode, I argue that Purple Island
gives the body-mind relationship physicality.
It is important that the poem uses an exploration of the body as a channel for explicating
the majesty of the human mind precisely because Fletcher utilizes a dissective mode to do this.
By doing this, he hinges The Purple Island at the turning point between older viewpoints that
saw the body as a relatively lowly “corporeal prison” compared to the mind for the pursuit of
self-knowledge, and newer methods like dissection which saw the body as an opportunity for
expanded knowledge of the self, incorporating both in his poem. Ultimately, the poem’s careful,
somewhat dissective journey into the immaterial mind resists a Cartesian view of the body by
suggesting that the body itself, as well as the study of it, can be conduits towards an
understanding of the most immaterial, most acutely human faculties. Fletcher’s poem should be
seen as a particular kind of response to the early modern period’s emerging culture of
dissection—it is a perfect representation of how this culture provided a new way not just to better
understand nature’s design, but also to know our selves more intimately; Fletcher’s particular
fashioning of himself into a kind of literary anatomist combined with, as I will show, his
conviction that he writes an “autology,” enable him to particularly strongly create a harmony of
mind and body, and frame this harmony as part of the self. In this way, The Purple Island marks
itself as an important pre-Cartesian literary exploration of the body that encapsulates the
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philosophical complexities of the short transitional period between long-standing and newly
emerging perspectives on the body.
Autology Via Poetic Anatomy and Dissection
Importantly, Fletcher’s mark on seventeenth-century discourse regarding the body’s role
in defining the self is made through a poem that tells a fictional story about the body, which is
imagined as an island nation. However, Purple Island is not presented as a fiction—instead, the
poem is framed as an educational, theological text written in the name of self-knowledge. In an
opening address to the poem’s readers, theologian Daniel Featly (1582-1645) writes, “He that
would learn Theology, must first study Autology. The Way to God is by ourselves.” He
continues, writing that The Purple Island “will make [the reader] understand that Way” (ix). The
Oxford English Dictionary defines autology as “self-knowledge; study of oneself,” and marks
Featly’s address as the first case of the word’s use. A search for “autology” anywhere in the
Early English Books Online database returns no examples of the word being used prior to the
poem’s publication in 1633—only numerous mid-century dictionaries purporting to define
“difficult terms” or “such hard words as are derived from other languages” and containing
“autology” in these lists (OED Online). This strange word and the meaning behind it forms the
basis of the intuition behind Fletcher’s project: the human body is a valuable site of
self-knowledge. It is worthwhile to note that autology as simply self-knowledge was not by any
means a new concept in 1633; the motto “Nosce te Ipsum” (“Know Thyself”) was a familiar one
in early modern culture (Sawday 9). However, Fletcher’s particular combining of autology
through anatomy together with theological knowledge treads relatively new ground, as I explain
below. As mentioned above, Cartesian philosophies that discard the body to privilege the mind as
the primary site of meaning grew dominant soon after Purple Island’s publication; in contrast,
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the poem—at least in part—presents knowledge of the body as a conduit towards the highest
possible meaning. For Fletcher, understanding anatomy provides direct access to streams of
spiritual and theological meaning that coexist with the body. This notion that knowledge of the
body is linked to knowledge of God was, by 1633, a very old one; early modern anatomists were
guided by the belief, which stretches back as far as antiquity, that “the human body expressed in
miniature the divine workmanship of God”—that it was a microcosm of the greater universe
(Sawday 23). The Purple Island’s careful and imaginative allegory bestows dignity on even the
lowliest bodily functions, connecting even these to God.
One example of this is the poem’s description of defecation. The poem describes the
entrails, or, intestines as a port city in the lower region of the island which is composed of a
system of pipes that regulate the proper flow and disposal of “passengers.” Notably, in his
marginal notes, Fletcher explains that the pipes (entrails) are themselves part of a hierarchy
between the thin and the thick, and that “the thinne have the more noble office” (34), also
repeating this sentiment in one of the section’s stanzas: “whereof three noble are, and thinne;
three thick, & vile” (2.39.7). When the poem’s narrator gets to the description of the rectum,
called “port Esquiline,” its “vile” or baser nature is made clear, but at the same time the stanza
retains the sense that God’s perfect handiwork is evident in its design:
The last down-right falls to port Esquiline
More strait above, beneath still broader growing;
Soon as the gate opes by the Kings assigne2,
Empties it self, farre thence the filth out-throwing:
This gate endow’d with many properties,
Yet for his office sight and naming flies;
Therefore between two hills, in darkest valley lies (2.43.1-7).
In the marginal notes, Fletcher explains that the fact that the rectum is “straight … short, [and]
larger toward the end [enables] … the excrement … [to] more easily be ejected, and retained also
2

The poem seems to use “King” and “Prince” interchangeably throughout the poem to describe the human intellect.
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upon occasion” (35). Thus, Fletcher ascribes a certain dignity to the design of the rectum,
indicating that its shape perfectly enables it to perform its function. In other words, he gives the
impression that even this lowliest bodily function is evidence of God’s thoughtful, highly
functional design of the body. There is also a certain level of autonomy suggested by this
description, which further dignifies the function of defecation. In his marginal note, Fletcher
highlights the rectum’s ability to “retain” excrement voluntarily. In Intimacy and Sexuality in the
Age of Shakespeare (2012), James M. Bromley writes that Fletcher describes the “rectum’s
voluntary control over evacuation as a form of political authority,” and that Fletcher’s emphasis
on the body’s ability to “hold back” or to evacuate excrement “figures a person’s relationship to
his or her body in terms of domination” (52-3). Though Fletcher’s stanza describes the rectum as
being necessarily far from the King’s sight, relegated to this “darkest valley,” and though the
process of excretion is initiated by mandate of the King, the stanza and Fletcher’s margins
together indicate that the rectum possesses some capability of voluntary control, framing the
function of defecation as ultimately the result of a thoughtful, highly functional grand design,
however ignoble. Here we can see how Fletcher’s poem embraces detailed, intimate knowledge
of the body, its interior, and all of its functions as a conduit towards higher meaning and
knowledge of God and of the self.
Arguably, Purple Island enacts its particular autology via stanzas that, together, mimic
the work of dissection as the narrator allegorically reveals the inner-workings of the body down
to its finest details—the instruments of swallowing or the knitting of cartilage—with systematic
order and precision. As mentioned above, many early modern thinkers viewed gaining
knowledge of the body as a way to learn more about God’s divine workmanship in nature; using
the same rationale, the emerging sixteenth and seventeenth-century anatomical science and
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practice of dissection were similarly theologically justified. The publication of a poetic anatomy
as comprehensive as Purple Island inserts Fletcher neatly into this tradition of
Christianity-approved dissective practice. However, it is worthwhile to note that there was some
controversy and anxiety surrounding the early development of the science of dissection which
complicates Fletcher’s use of this knowledge; however, his particular dissective mode ultimately
satisfies longstanding Christian conceptualizations of the nobility of the body.
In the seventeenth century, European culture and society underwent a shift away from the
emphasis of the universal in favor of the particular, a transition which can also be seen as fitting
within the broader context of the period’s “scientific revolution,” which encouraged
knowledge-making through an “endless partitioning of the world and all that it contained”
(Sawday 3). This new way of making sense of the world was part of what cultural historian
Jonathan Sawday calls “the culture of dissection” (Sawday 2). Alongside this rise of anatomical
science and dissection, the older models of microcosmic-macrocosmic correspondence and
symmetry were shaken, and many European early modern anatomies thus became characterized
by anxiety about unity versus partition, often defensively insisting “that the part is by definition a
part only in relation to the whole” (Hillman and Mazzio xv). Echoes of similar sentiments show
up in numerous places in The Purple Island, such as one moment when Fletcher describes how
the Creator composed the body “with curious art; / Which like an Index briefly shou’d impart /
The summe of all; the whole, yet of the whole a part” (1.43.5-7). Overall, fragmentation and
unity meet in Purple Island as Fletcher holds on to older models of correspondence and
harmony, while simultaneously engaging in this new culture of dissection as he attempts to make
both anatomical and theological sense of the body. What results is a kind of defense of the
microcosmic, cosmological, harmonious view of the body through a “dissection” that balances
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partition with unity—the poem’s first five cantos carefully, methodically describe regions of the
body and its many ingeniously crafted parts in extreme detail, while the last seven cantos are
mostly dedicated to the mind, its link to Heaven and moral virtues. Importantly, it is the mind,
which is described as the island’s “Prince,” that is revealed as the chief mediator of heavenly
influence for the body: the Prince is “replenisht with celestial light,” and, using this light, “All
coming evils could foresee and flie” (83). Using both the language of monarchy and of Heaven,
Fletcher is able to reconcile the uncomfortable reality of the body’s many parts with theology by
emphasizing the mind’s role of fundamentally linking the body to God.
Similarly to the struggle over partition, the emerging early modern science of dissection
had to overcome the taboo surrounding the “voyeuristic manipulation” of dead human bodies
which had necessarily been denied a Christian burial; to cut into the body’s interior meant
entering the “corrupt world of mortality, … decay, … [and] spiritual dissolution” (Sawday 21).
The fact that Fletcher chose to investigate the body in such detail in his poem thus made his
project somewhat of a difficult one—Purple Island had to somehow “peer into” the body in a
way that joined it with Christian moral structures. We can start to see the significance of Purple
Island being published in 1633: Fletcher and his theologian contemporaries were adapting to this
expanding culture of dissection. Evidently, there were elements of this emerging dissective
practice that made bodies seem less noble; in particular, Descartes shaped a distinctly Cartesian
culture of dissection which not only could consider the body as a discrete entity, but also turned
the body into a kind of inanimate object or machine, given significance and animation only by
the immaterial soul which is able to exist entirely separate from its corporeal vessel. However,
Fletcher’s Purple Island “dissects” the body using a chronology that helps it reaffirm the links
between body and immaterial mind/soul.

Simeone 18
Arguably, the practice of dissection fundamentally requires the performance of a
particular chronology when moving through the body’s parts, and the establishment of a certain
hierarchy or organization. Rationales for anatomical organization rested on the Early Modern
ideological foundation that “nature is the primary form of beauty,” a notion that can be traced
back to Galen and, before him, to Aristotle (Garrison, lxx). This conviction was aligned with the
centuries-old teleological view of the body as being inherently endowed with divine purpose.
Historian Vivian Nutton, in a 2014 edition of Vesalius’s landmark anatomical texts On the Fabric
of the Human Body (1543), writes that Vesalius chose to focus Book I of the Fabrica on the
bones, which he emphasized as being crucially important for the body by supporting and
controlling movement. Nutton explains that Vesalius claimed that in anatomy courses taught by
his contemporaries, the study of bones was often left to the end, so these courses thereby “missed
the opportunity to reveal the wondrous workings of Creator” (Nutton, XC). Notably, Fletcher
also begins his poem focused on the bones, which are described as the island’s foundation; this
choice suggests that Fletcher may have been following the precedent laid out by Vesalius’s
extremely influential work, and therefore indicates that Fletcher was at least somewhat
preoccupied with chronology in his poetic anatomy. Given this, it seems even more significant
that Fletcher’s narrator, like Vesalius again, ends his survey of the island with an exploration of
the brain, the undisputed top of the anatomical hierarchy. It is clear then that for Fletcher, writing
a poetic anatomy that drew upon real conventions of anatomical science and dissection would be
key to the poem’s facilitation of self-knowledge.
In addition, Fletcher goes beyond inspiration from anatomical texts in a sense, at one
point transcending the physical brain to take us into the immaterial mind in order to describe the
positions, functions, and organization of the intellectual faculties as well as moral virtues and
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vices. As Purple Island completes its dissection-esque progression through the “Isle,” it proceeds
closer to those components of the human that perhaps most intensely help to shape the self. That
the poem places its exploration of the immaterial mind at the end of a chronology mimicking
those followed by anatomists further reveals how Fletcher is able to seamlessly join body and
mind rather than separate them. Fletcher’s dissective mode thus serves his autological
purpose—it follows early modern conventions predicated on the belief that study of the body
provides an opportunity for expanded knowledge of the self and of God, and suggests even in its
chronology that knowledge of the body can lead to crucial knowledge of the immaterial mind.
There is a caveat—Purple Island does distance mind from body when it affirms the
notion that the body is the mind/soul’s “corporeal prison.” At one point, Fletcher imagines that
the mind is “prest down in captive chains, and pent in [the] earthly mold” of the body (6.65.7).
However, because the poem is framed under the banner of autology and spends its first five
cantos focused entirely on a detailed poetic anatomy of the body, the poem still ultimately
manages to position knowledge of the body as a conduit to knowledge of the mind. As a later
section of this chapter will show, Fletcher’s poem at many points emphasizes the body’s
mortality and susceptibility, better positioning the mind as the body’s saving grace. As we will
see, Purple Island echoes the longstanding notion that it is simply the fate of the mind—“Who
th’deitie inflesht, and mans flesh deifi’d” (6.72.7)—to be encased in the flesh and bone of the
body, for better or for worse, while the body is gifted Heaven’s influence only because of the
mind. Prior to the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, understanding the body’s interior had
to coincide with analyzing the soul/the mind which gave it its significance; many thinkers
established that the body’s reason for being is to serve as the temporary lodging and instrument
of the immaterial, immortal soul. In this model, which can be partially attributed to Plato and is
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seen in the works of many other authors from Augustine of Hippo to Donne, the body was often
seen as the “close prison which perpetually sought to constrain the expansionary desire” of the
mind (Sawday 20). This view, which was dominant within western culture prior to the fifteenth
century, held that the body confines the mind to a punishing corporeal existence.
As demonstrated above, echoes of this older view of this body-mind struggle are strong
in Purple Island. So, while The Purple Island does not sever body from mind, the poem does
negotiate this tradition of valorizing the mind far above the body as a site of meaning and
purpose. By including lines that keep the body subordinate to the mind, Fletcher anticipates the
Cartesian perspective to some extent, which built upon the corporeal prison idea to further
subordinate the body to the point where it is viewed as entirely separate from the mind/soul, and
no more significant for selfhood than if it were an inanimate object. However, even the poem’s
emphases on the mortality (and therefore relative inferiority) of the body, because they are a part
of Fletcher’s autological poetic anatomy, indicate that the poem views study of the body as
crucial for truly grasping the expansive power and function of the mind. In its mimesis of an
anatomist’s work, the poem often details how different body parts work to defend against disease
and are fashioned with protective properties—for example, the flow of animal spirits are
“guarded with double trenches” (vein pairs) (2.12.4), and stomach muscles are “guards” who
“with constant watch compasse” the Isle’s lower region (2.21.1-2). The poem’s emphasis on the
body as a defensive system highlights its mortality and fragility, contrasting the mind/immortal
soul. However, perhaps part of Fletcher’s autology suggests that had Purple Island not
constructed such a careful poetic anatomy and “dissection,” we would not have arrived at such a
clear and tangible understanding of the mind’s capability. In another stanza, the narrator
describes the eyelashes who defend the “castle” of the brain; they are imagined as “spearmen”
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sitting atop the eyelids “their pikes intending, / Watch[ing] both night and day, the castles port
defending” (5.27.6-7). Here, as in the other passages, the poem ultimately manages to strengthen
the reader’s understanding of the ties binding body to mind, because we are able to visualize
these ties in a tangible way through this kind of dissective mode he uses. As always, the poem
positions knowledge of the body as a conduit towards advanced knowledge of the mind.
The Need for Autology and the Body’s Importance
The Purple Island’s opening pages seem to frame knowledge of the body as a desperately
needed and even threatened form of knowledge. Poet Francis Quarles (1592-1644) writes in a
commendatory verse included with the poem about the “Isle” (the body) that it is “A place too
seldom view’d, yet still in view; / Near as ourselves, yet farthest from our care; / … A foreign
home, a strange, tho’ native coast; / Most obvious to all, yet most unknown to most” (1.34.3-7).
Here, Quarles uses the language of travel to lament at how the body is at once native and foreign;
it is almost as if knowledge of the body is, for Fletcher and his supporters, in jeopardy—“still in
view,” but not enough in our care. This kind of sentiment may be a reaction to an inherited
history of shifting attitudes towards anatomical knowledge. Plato saw the soul/the mind as by far
the most important component of the human, “the body being merely its workhouse in this
world. [Thus], investigation into the body would have been an investigation into mere matter”
(Mitchell, 48). It is evident from The Purple Island that Fletcher does not share this
conviction—for him, the body clearly merits investigation. An influx of Aristotelian ideas about
the body and soul beginning in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries shifted perceptions about
the body and dissection away from Platonic ideas; these ideas continued to be influential, and the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw another return to Aristotle, this time to the anatomical
projects of Aristotle and Galen which, as they were revived, led to the development of the
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practice of dissection and the period’s “renewed intellectual interest in the human body”
(Mitchell, 18). Perhaps then we can read Fletcher and his supporters’ eagerness to instate the
body as the location of “autology” as a part of this renewal, which signals that intellectual
interest in the human body was not a fixed and unshakeable one in the seventeenth century, but
rather one requiring regenerating effort from investigators like Fletcher.
Importantly, the island-nation seems to be framed by the beginning of the poem as a
still-emerging one. One section appears to allegorically describe the fall of Adam and Eve from
grace by imagining that the Serpent “allures … [the Isle] from the peacefull shore, … / And …
Drench[es] [it] in dead seas … / [and] sulphur waves” (1.54.3-6), plunging the Isle in “curelesse
grief and endlesse errour” until Christ rescues the Isle from the lake (1.57.2). Now that the Isle
has been saved, the narrator describes “this Islands new recover’d seat,” and begins his extensive
narration of the island’s current terrain (1.60.2). That the body is described here as a new,
potentially still-emerging structure mirrors the body’s emergence in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries as a subject capable of being examined for its own significance as a
discrete entity. As the poem continues, the “land” of the body is specifically characterized as
undiscovered territory. In this view, there is so much that is unknown to us about our bodies, and
exploration beyond this native land is fruitless: “while your selves and native home forgetting, /
You search farre distant worlds with needlesse sweating, / You never finde yourselves; so lose ye
more by getting” (1.38.5-7). Here, it seems as though the body could hardly be more important
for Fletcher—it is seemingly the primary site of valuable self-knowledge, as there is nothing
worthwhile to be discovered in the “distant worlds.”
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However, there are other moments in the poem that suggest a different motivation behind
this expressed need for readers to “finde [themselves].” In another one of his opening remarks,
Francis Quarles writes that the metaphorical “house” that is the body is
the likeliest building sometimes known
To fall by oblivious chances; overthrown
Ofttimes by tempests, by the full-mouth’d blasts
Of heav’n; sometimes by fire; sometimes it wastes
Through unadvis’d neglect: put case the stuffe
Were ruine-proofe, by nature strong enough
To conquer time, and age; …
What hast thou then, proud flesh and blood, to boast?
Thy dayes are evil, at best; but few, at most;
But sad, at merriest; and but weak, at strongest;
Unsure, at surest; and but short, at longest (11).
The urgency of The Purple Island’s autology is clear here in a new sense—the body itself is
vulnerable and prone to many threats; instead of revering the body in this passage, Quarles
suggests that the body—“flesh and blood”—is in reality rather ignoble. The weakness of flesh is
highlighted here—Quarles is pointing to the fact that as the body decays (“wastes”) over time, it
also faces continuous threats. So, the perceived need for autology suggested by Quarles and
Fletcher can perhaps be paraphrased as a need also to answer Quarles’ question, “What hast thou
then, proud flesh and blood, to boast?” In other words, the poem must determine and express the
worth of the body and knowledge of it despite its mortality, at the same time as real cadavers of
the early seventeenth century were being laid out on the dissection tables of Europe. As
discussed in the prior section, this idea of the susceptible body shows up throughout Fletcher’s
poem; here, there is a strong sense that The Purple Island’s autology is urgent in part because the
body is weak and base when compared to the mind. It seems, then, that a framing goal of the
poem is to delineate what it is about the body that is dignified and valuable; in the end, the poem
largely enables us to see vividly how the mind/the soul give the body much of its dignity, raising
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it above its baser station. Here, we again see a tension in Purple Island between Fletcher’s
apparent reverence for the body and all its workmanship and his view of the body’s deference to
the mind, but ultimately the poem reveals that this deference may be better and more effectively
served via detailed knowledge of the body and its inner-workings.
Fletcher’s Beautiful, Ordered Body
Language of beauty and grandeur in Purple Island both strengthens the poem’s
admiration of the body as well as sets up its stronger admiration of the mind ahead of cantos
focused on the mind-body relationship. As discussed, for much of his poem, Fletcher elevates the
body as a wondrous creation. As he does this, he demonstrates the beauty of the body in parts
while at the same time gradually re-establishing the body’s link to the unified whole of
christological correspondences and the mind. In lieu of a prefacing statement by Fletcher
himself, we can read Featly and the other contributors’ opening remarks as representative of
Fletcher’s aims for the poem as a vehicle for self-knowledge. In addition to his mention of
autology in his opening address, Daniel Featly writes, “here are no blocks for the purblinde; no
snares for the timerous; no dangers for the bold: I invite all sorts to be readers; all readers to be
understanders; all understanders to be happie” (4). Writings on anatomy gained an expanded
readership in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in part because authors employed new
mediums for describing the body—Fletcher inherits and adds to this history of innovative writing
about the body. Nearly a century before The Purple Island’s publication, Vesalius’s On the
Fabric of the Human Body (1543) transformed Europeans’ knowledge of themselves in part
because he accompanied his descriptions with unprecedented illustrations—both drawings of the
body and other supplemental drawings such as those of cherubs playing in and out of the letters
and mimicking the work of the anatomist (Nutton, xciii). Vesalius was driven, like many others
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in his time, to “picture nature in new ways” and sought to display the body in a way that fully
captured the reverence he felt it deserved (Garrison, lxvi); with his books, the “noblest work of
the Creator is given appropriate homage in words and pictures” (Nutton, xcii). Vivian Nutton has
discussed how anatomy had long been viewed as a lesser art exercised by “lower class, monoglot
surgeons, masters of the knife and human butchers” via the growing practice of dissection
(Nutton, ciii). With the Fabrica’s 1543 publication alongside elaborate illustrations ripe with
significations and allusions, “the human body is transferred from the sordid dissection display to
… the pure white of the printed page,” and anatomy is elevated to an art fit for educated
gentlemen (Nutton, xcii).
In addition to meeting a perceived need for bodily autology with Purple Island as
previously discussed, it seems that Fletcher also viewed poetic modes—including the pastoral,
the epic, and the allegorical—as important filters for the particular anatomical knowledge he
hoped to impart. Similarly to the works of Vesalius and other early modern anatomists, Fletcher’s
poetic anatomy helps to further elevate the body as a beautiful and wondrous creation. As the
poem continues its dissective journey through the island, it arrives at the head in the fifth canto,
which harbors both the brain and the face. The face is imagined to be a “precinct” of this region,
and is described as the “best and chief of all, / … therefore fram’d like heaven, sphericall, / …
[and] of loveliest grace” (5.4.1-4). Here, Fletcher once again aligns his dissective mode to those
practices of dissection which were theologically justified, as he imagines and visualizes the
face’s link to Heaven and to God. Furthermore, the face is then described as “th’Isle’s Epitomie,
Where ev’n the Princes thoughts are often read: / For … / Fair on the face wrote the Index of the
minde” (5.8.3-7). Here, Fletcher, even within the poem’s dissective process of breaking the head
region into parts, establishes a link between the body (the face) and the mind;

Simeone 26
dissection/fragmentation and harmony/unity work together in Purple Island to express the beauty
of the body and its parts.
As this passage also suggests by emphasizing the Heaven-like beauty of the face, as
much as it elevates the body as a beautiful creation, Fletcher’s aesthetic language about beauty in
the body also helps to clarify the mind’s eminence. The majority of Fletcher’s language of
grandeur, beauty, and regality is found in the poem’s depictions of the mind. Early Modern
anatomists believed that there is an “esthetic dimension in the human fabric” and that the
anatomist should be no less committed than the artist to “illustrating the beauty of the human
form” (Garrison, lxx). Seemingly motivated by the same drive, Fletcher ensures that The Purple
Island’s Isle is “fram’d with wondrous sense and art” at every turn (2.32.1), and continually
emphasizes the purpose and design of each body part rather than simply the overall structure of
the body. In describing the body’s design, Fletcher at times even uses language of ornamentation;
notably, he appears to save these blatantly aesthetic descriptions for those body parts which hold
particularly prominent office in the body’s hierarchy. For instance, in the poem’s section on the
body’s lower region, Fletcher clarifies in an endnote that “Of all this lower region, the Hepar, or
liver, is the principal” (38). He then writes that “in this fair town the Isle’s great steward dwells; /
… [and] glitters in purple dye” (3.8.1-2) that is like a “rubies sheen” (3.6.5). With this language
of a glittering, ruby-colored appearance, Fletcher strengthens his depiction of the liver as an
eminent figure in the body. It soon becomes clear how Fletcher’s language of beauty and
grandeur helps the poem’s mind-body hierarchy to emerge.
Body-Mind Harmony Established Via Dissection of the Mind
The fact that Fletcher uses this language of grandeur and regality to help the reader
picture the body’s hierarchy ultimately helps us see that the mind is considered to be the most
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beautiful element of the island of all. In the whole of The Purple Island, the body is depicted as a
hierarchy made up of “three metropolis’s jointly sway’d; / Ord’ring in peace and war their
governments, / With loving concord, and with mutual aid” (2.14.2-4). Though these three regions
are very much connected, linked through “loving concord” and “mutual aid,” there is very
clearly a hierarchy organizing them; this is made especially apparent through the language of
government and politics, which is highly suggestive of order and rank. As Fletcher explains in a
marginal note, the Isle’s three regions are the lowest (the belly), the middle (the breast) and the
highest (the head). In the lowest, as we have seen, the liver is sovereign, in the middle, “the heart
reigns, most necessary,” and finally, the brain “obtains the highest place, and is … the greatest in
dignity” (21). Distinguished “characters” populate the Island—the teeth “are twice sixteen
porters” (2.30.1) and the tongue a “Groom with wondrous volubilitie” (2.31.1), for instance—but
ultimately, it is the liver, the heart, and the brain that hold the highest offices, with the brain
being the most grand and regal figure of them all. In the poem’s final cantos, Fletcher focuses on
the mind—the Island’s “Prince.” Fletcher writes that the mind is
of frame more than celestial,
[and] Is rightly call’d th’all seeing Intellect;
All glorious bright, such nothing is terrestrial;
Whose Sun-like face, and most divine aspect
No humane sight may ever hope describe:
For when himself on’s self reflects his eye,
Dull and amaz’d he stands at so bright majestie (6.28.1-7).
For Fletcher, then, the mind exists far above the Isle’s terrestrial bounds—it is so significant that
it exists more in the heavens than on the same plane as the body; Fletcher even writes that the
Prince’s “strangest body is not bodily, / But matter without matter” (6.30.1-2). Here, in addition
to this emphasis on the immateriality of the mind, Fletcher’s language in the above stanza very
much emphasizes inexpressibility—the mind shines too bright to be perceived or described. It is
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interesting then that Fletcher so strongly highlights the mind’s inexpressibility and unreachability
here, because in the next few cantos the poem lets us into the interiority of the mind in a way that
not only seems to be an attempt at a true description of the mind but that also gives the mind a
certain materiality.
As alluded to earlier with the reflections on the poem’s description of the choroid plexus,
Purple Island often makes mind-body communication visible, making clear the ways in which
corporeality serves the mind/soul. Throughout the poem, the mind is continually in
correspondence with the body; the brain is always sending “mandate[s]” to body parts, such as to
the nerves carrying sense and motion from the brain (20). Fletcher writes that “no nook or corner
flies [the Prince’s] piercing sight” (6.29.3) and “while his weary kingdome safely sleeps, / All
restless night he watch and warding keeps” (6.31.5-7). The mind is continually in
communication with the body—sending it commands and acting as its ultimate defense. The
mind and body even work together to heal: in one passage, personified Repentance “pricks the
heart in tender vein” (6.63.3) before releasing tears—“these cordiall drops, these spirit-healing
balms / [that] Cure all her sinful bruises” (6.64.1-2). Here, an entity of the mind signals to the
body to aid its work—in this case, tears are called to cure the body of sin on behalf of
Repentance.
However, the poem does not always describe the body-mind relationship as a symbiotic
one; although, because the poem continually forces us to consider the anatomical, corporeal
relationship between mind and body, ultimately it is arguably the mind-body union that is
stressed. Fletcher at times indicates that the mind and body are at odds, and simultaneously
stresses the eminence of the mind. For example, he writes that the Prince “is Shut in a Tower
where thousand enemies / Assault the fort … / [and] by diverse spies / Searches into his foes and
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friends designs: / For most he fears his subjects wavering minds. / This Tower then onley falls,
when treason undermines” (6.38.2-7). Here, the body is depicted as being capable of acting
separately from the mind and even against it, which contradicts much of the body-mind harmony
established by the rest of the poem. So, the poem's narrator asks, “what are those warlike
Knights” that protect the mind against the body’s attackers (9.5.4) both within and without. In the
poem’s later cantos, many stanzas are dedicated to answering this question; the first answer is
“Heaven,” and then the narrator lists many personified virtues as “Commanders,” including
Knowledge, Contemplation, Humility, Obedience, Faith, Penance, Amendment, Gratitude,
Patience, Fortitude, Temperance, Chastity, and Modesty (6-41). Fletcher thus completes his
autological project—Christian virtues protect the mind against the body’s threats. Because these
cantos focus on how the body’s treason is stopped by external, divine forces channeled through
the mind, what emerges from the poem is in part Fletcher’s unwillingness to detach from the old
model of the body as a prison, loathsome in comparison to the mind. However, though in many
ways this emphasis on the body’s treason seems to separate mind from body, it also seems that
by taking the reader on a journey through the body, where we can visualize the body’s physical
relationship to the mind as both a defender and a threat, the reader is ultimately better equipped
to understand the virtues of the mind, which act as conduits for heavenly influence. In other
words, the immaterial, moral processes of the mind are rendered visible as the poem
“materializes” the body’s treasonous subjects as well as the mind’s warlike knights.
The poem’s exploration in the sixth canto enters a very metaphysical space that allows us
detailed access to the mind. The poem’s narrator informs us that while the mind (the Prince) is
“shut in a Tower” which is the head (6.38.2), we will now try to “view his glories wonderment, /
And get a sight of what we so admire” (6.39.3-4). Already, the poem is inviting us into the
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interiority of the mind, like it took us into the interiority of the body, in a way that it has claimed
should be impossible. Interestingly, the poem seems to indicate that it is because the mind is
trapped in the body that it can be in our view: the narrator tells us that while the Prince “lurks in
earthly tent,” we must try to “view his glories,” because “when away from this sad place he flies,
/ And in the skies abides, … / Too glorious is his sight for our dimme mortall eyes” (6.39.1-7).
Here, though the body is what imprisons the mind, it is also what allows us to gain knowledge of
the mind’s most “unknowable” qualities.
As Thomas Healy remarks in his 1991 essay on the poem, the final cantos’ description of
these qualities is “given the appearance of the dissection continued,” as if we are still to some
extent engaged in a tour of the physical body (348). Up to this point in the poem, the poem’s
narrator had been “dissecting” the island region by region, mostly describing its physical
properties as well as the many defenders that populate it and the distribution of labor among
parts. When the poem focuses in on the mind, the approach is not all that different—we are
introduced to the mind’s eight counselors: “Within the Castle sit eight Counsellors, / That help
him in this tent to govern well” (6.41.1-2). The narrator tells us that the Prince/the King has three
“inmost private counsel”—the understanding, the will, and the Church or elect. The other
counselors, the “five senses,” are described as “five of less dignitie” who “have outward Courts,
and in all actions prie,” but refer certain tasks to “Courts more fit and high” (6.41.2-7). This
systematic description of the Castle’s “inhabitants,” where they reside, and what their
organization is very much mirrors the dissective mode used throughout the poem to explore the
body. In other words, in this new venture into the Castle, there is not immediately that much of
an indication that the poem is entering a new, non-dissective space. In this way, the language of
the poem itself seems to register a struggle over the extent to which the mind can be described as
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in part a corporeal entity. As the canto continues, there is similar imagery of functional and
orderly collaboration between moving “parts” in the mind to the imagery that the poem
previously used to gain knowledge of bodily functions and organization. One example of this is
when the narrator explains the duty of personified common sense to take in all of the five senses’
informings in order to act as a “Judge and Arbiter” of every thing (6.42.6). Describing how this
“Judge” disseminates his rulings, the narrator tells us: “through strait waies the nimble Post
ascends / Unto his hall; there up his message sends, / Which to the next well scann’d he
straightway recommends” (6.45.1-7). The canto continues in a similar vein—another stanza
describes how the fancy, “Phantastes,” sends his messages to the Prince who scrutinizes them
before “commit[ting] them to his Treasurie, / Which old Eumnestes keeps, Father of memorie”
(6.48.1-7). In these stanzas, Fletcher leverages a similarly dissective mode as was used in earlier
cantos to let us into the interiority of the mind, despite the poem’s insistence on the
inexpressibility of the immaterial mind.
These cantos appear as an attempt to demystify the mind’s workings using an approach
meant for exploring physicality; in this sixth canto, the poem paradoxically explores the mind as
if we can know it like we can know the body. So much of his poem is about knowledge of the
body, but Fletcher clearly distinguishes the mind as the most crucial component of the human
and in some ways frames knowledge of the mind as the ultimate goal of the poem. Given this, it
appears that Fletcher saw extensive exploration of the body as a prerequisite to gaining intimate
knowledge of the mind. Purple Island indicates that the value of the body is partially in its ability
to be dissected—to open itself up to our autology, or, our endeavors in self-knowledge. The
poem facilitates a similar process with exploration of the mind, and in doing so materializes the
body-mind relationship, giving it a certain tangibility that is familiar in study of the material

Simeone 32
body but not in the study of the immaterial mind. Though Fletcher’s allegiance to the “corporeal
prison” model (which in some ways distances body from mind) is evident in his poem, The
Purple Island ultimately indicates that it is precisely the mind’s close relationship to the body
that enables us to understand it and its incredible faculties.
Conclusion
Jonathan Sawday has argued that Fletcher’s Purple Island “looked back to the harmony
of body and soul which the older metaphors of correspondence had once traced. In this sense,
The Purple Island was the very last gasp of the old mentality,” before the narrative that the body
is entirely distinct from the soul took over (172). I have argued that, though Fletcher’s poem
navigates tensions between the value of the body versus the value of the mind, it ultimately
frames bodily knowledge as crucial for understanding the mind and for understanding the self;
this creates one kind of harmony between body and mind—knowledge about both can be served
by an exploration of the body’s functions, structures, and hierarchies. Fletcher’s literary anatomy
also creates another kind of mind-body unity: Fletcher uses his dissective mode to challenge
even the distinction of immaterial and material, observing and describing the mind in a very
similar way to how the body is dissected, thereby emphasizing the embodiment of the mind in a
way that becomes rare at the end of the seventeenth century. Whether for better or worse, Purple
Island’s dissective mode continually reminds us of and encourages us to consider the
embodiment of the mind. In this way, Purple Island is an important manifestation of a pivotal
moment in the seventeenth century when the culture of dissection accomplished a dual anatomy
where humans could understand themselves as both fragmented and whole beings. The Purple
Island does not ultimately reduce the wholeness of the human, paradoxically demonstrating the
unity of mind and body by studying it as a dissected, partitioned thing. The next chapter explores
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a text that is an altogether different response to the seventeenth-century culture of dissection, this
time at the end of the century, when Cartesian philosophy had largely solidified the human as a
bifurcated being that is, in the end, truly defined only by the mind.
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Chapter Two: The Anatomy of Disembodiment in A Voyage to the World of Cartesius
The Purple Island intervenes in anatomical knowledge by embracing the traditional
holistic view of the body while creating an autology that benefits from the way a dissective mode
can open up and make visible the strong link between mind and body. In contrast, Gabriel
Daniel’s A Voyage to the World of Cartesius, published nearly sixty years later, for the most part
no longer attempts to delineate anatomy’s relationship to harmony—perhaps because by 1690,
early modern philosophy had largely moved on to a new model that appeared to disrupt this
anatomical harmony in profound ways: the machine metaphor of the body. This model defined
the body as a purely mechanistic entity which was ultimately no different than a man-made
automaton, and in this way was easily severed from the mind, and was no longer seen as a nearly
equal determinant of selfhood and of what makes us human.
The machine metaphor of the seventeenth century is largely attributed to Descartes, and
can be seen as the result of a Cartesian anatomical and philosophical culture that in some ways
anxiously solidified the distinction of the body amidst the growing presence of lifelike automata
in European culture. In his lifetime, Descartes visited the royal gardens of St. Germain-en-Laye,
built in the 1550s for Henri II, which made a deep impact on him; he was particularly affected by
its animated statues—added to the garden’s grottoes and fountains in the early seventeenth
century—which, according to his descriptions in Treatise on Man (1662),3 could even appear to
play certain instruments or utter words depending on the movement of the pipes (Maisano,
“Infinite Gesture,” 73-4). A famous passage from Meditations (1641) reveals how Descartes’s
experience with automata influenced how he began to see the human body: in it, he asks, “if I
look out of the window and see men crossing the square, … do I see any more than hats and
3

Treatise on Man is an unfinished treatise that Descartes wrote in the years 1629-33, but that was first published
posthumously in 1662. So, Descartes’ reflections in Treatise about the St. Germain-en-Laye gardens, in reality,
preceded his reflections in Meditations.
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coats which could conceal automatons?” (68). By 1641, then, it was clear that Descartes felt that
the human body was essentially indistinguishable from the many automata—mechanical birds,
animated clocks, moving statues—which populated both the real world and the literary
imagination of seventeenth-century Europe.4
Since his visits to the royal gardens, much of Descartes’s philosophical writing attempted
to illustrate that animation in human beings, just like in the lifelike statues, did not require the
presence of a rational soul; it is as if, in the presence of such uncanny imitations of human
physicality, the body no longer seemed like something that separates us from either animals or
man-made objects. Though the culture of dissection that gave rise to Purple Island revealed the
body’s more automatic processes—Fletcher certainly created an anatomy that was ordered,
systematic, and to some extent self-sustaining—the poem’s depiction of the body is not
ultimately a mechanistic one, but rather a vitalistic, harmonious one. As I have discussed, this is
perhaps partly reflective of the fact that Fletcher wrote his poem at a time of indeterminacy—the
lines between partition and unity, and mind and body were not yet drawn. By 1690 and Daniel’s
Voyage, there were bolder lines, and a general consensus regarding the mechanistic view of the
body, which continued to be informed by Descartes’s legacy. While Daniel does try to resist
elements of this view, assert the importance of the body in defining the self, and generally
critique Cartesian anatomy, he does so much too late. Despite this, what ends up standing out is
the way his satire inadvertently calls attention to what the impetus behind the machine metaphor
was in the first place: an anxious need to assert humans’ transcendence of mechanism as a
growing number of automata and other artificial creations challenged our previously-held
conceptions of the body-soul relationship and the category of the human.
4

For a comprehensive collection of essays on literary representations of automata in the early modern period, see
Hyman, Wendy Beth., editor. The Automaton in English Renaissance Literature, Ashgate, 2011.
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It is worth noting that it is, at first, difficult to see Voyage as anything other than a failed
project—it is a satire aimed at Cartesianism which does not ultimately have any tangible impact
on the legacy of the ideas it attacks, including Cartesian dualism and anatomy, at least beyond
that of adding support to already-existing critiques. As philosopher Justin E.H. Smith points out
in a 2019 essay on the fiction, it is not entirely clear why Daniel decided to “take on
Cartesianism” when he did, especially seeing as the “doctrine he attacks in 1690 [was] hardly
new” at that point (793). Furthermore, as Smith writes, the Cartesians of Daniel’s time were, for
the most part, not defenders of the orthodox Cartesian views Daniel attacks, and instead
subscribed to a philosophy that had undergone fairly significant evolution away from the
standard version of Cartesianism in the years since Descartes’s death in 1650 (793). It is
therefore unclear how Daniel’s attack could have provoked its intended audience, and indeed the
fiction received little attention upon publication, and notably was not responded to by Cartesian
theologian Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), who was the intended target of Daniel’s effort (Smith
794). If Daniel was in fact less focused on a tangible impact and simply more interested in the
more superficial aim of provoking an adversary, it seems that this would have aligned with the
reputation given to him by some of his contemporaries. Smith quotes French theologian Pasquier
Quesnel (1634-1719), who wrote in 1693 about Daniel that “there is in the world a certain
personality who … is a sort of adventure-seeker, who wishes at whatever price, by means of
dazzling combat, to cause people to talk about him” (2); according to Quesnel, Smith notes,
Daniel was simply so disappointed at having failed to elicit a response from Arnauld to his
previous works that he decided to “try [Arnauld] out in a different spot”—Cartesianism (2). A
close-reading of Voyage to some extent supports Quesnel’s evaluation. As I will show throughout
this chapter, there are numerous places where Daniel’s attacks arguably miss the mark, and
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where they do not appear to be useful besides being echoes of already-circulated critiques against
Descartes which, by 1690, felt like too-late additions.
However, passages from Voyage’s opening pages indicate that, in writing the text, Daniel
was not just interested in provoking Arnauld and gaining attention, but also or instead was driven
by a sincere desire to have Voyage function as a work of serious philosophy that would reveal the
“truth.” Importantly, as author of this fiction, Daniel is a kind of outsider—he did not have the
social identity of “philosopher,” and, prior to the story’s publication, had previously been known
only for religious writings that implicated him in contemporaneous theological debates (Smith
791). We can begin to see how the import of Voyage, then, as a sort of outsider text, is as an
attempt to make sense of philosophical convictions, rather than uproot them; instead of being
read as a treatise that actively creates its own anatomy (or even successfully discredits the
structures it attacks), Voyage is perhaps better read as an inadvertent invitation to readers to
navigate the often comically competing fictional characters’ perspectives in order to ultimately
arrive at their own conclusions about the truth of notions about the body, humanity, and selfhood.
As it does this, regardless of whether Voyage successfully asserts any “truths” or lands any
critiques, I argue in this chapter that the most “successful” critique of Voyage’s is in its satirical
framing of Cartesian anatomy as a contrived fantasy, but that ultimately its impact seems more
usefully interpreted less as a critique and more as a lively reminder of the machine metaphor’s
fixation on transcendence.
It is worth elaborating on how Voyage can be understood as a landscape of competing
“observations” and perspectives that the reader must navigate. Importantly, as I have mentioned,
Daniel sees Voyage as a model of true philosophy—an exploration that is based on clarity and
evidence, features which he feels Descartes’s treatises lack. In his preface, Daniel writes that “no
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one will deny but that some of [Descartes’s] Principles … [are] meer Suppositions without
Proof” (xi). Here, Daniel’s critique seems to be, in part, one about demonstration—this is a
concern that, arguably, reflects the growing importance of tangible demonstrations and proofs for
early modern thinkers thanks to emergent forms of experiment-based science, including but not
limited to, anatomy and dissection. Passages from Descartes’s Meditations suggest that Daniel
was far from the first philosopher to express this concern about a lack of proof or demonstration
in Descartes’s thinking: Descartes’s laments that many of those people who refuse to believe his
claim that the human mind is wholly distinct from the body5—the claim which the majority of
this chapter focuses on—do so “for no other reason than their claim that … no one has been able
to demonstrate … [this]” (48).
It is worth considering that this idea of demonstration characterizes the particular notion
of proof utilized by early modern anatomists. Lawrence Principe, in The Scientific Revolution
(2011), reminds us that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “witnessed striking shifts in
thinking about the natural world and humanity’s place in it” (Principe). As I have discussed in
other parts of this project, new methods, priorities, and philosophies of knowledge production
were some of the most significant of these shifts—early modern natural philosophers
increasingly defined experiment, empiricism, observation, and demonstration as the
methodology requirements for discovery about the natural world. Medical historian Daniel H.
Garrison has noted that “Europe’s classical heritage had been knowledge based upon assertion,
argument, and (sometimes) description,” before discovery in the early modern period came to
rely more upon direct observation and hands-on investigation and instruction (LXVII). The
powerful influence of the notion of anatomia sensibilis—“anatomy you can see rather than what
you read” (Garrison LXVII)—a term coined in 1522 by Berengario da Carpi, reflects how
5

In Descartes’s Meditations, as in this project, “soul” and “mind” are used fairly interchangeably.
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important these principles were to early modern anatomy. The appearance of anatomical texts
augmented by illustrations—beginning with Berengario’s publications and later, the publication
of Vesalius’s Fabrica—directly manifested the notion of anatomia sensibilis. Such visual
explorations—which became the standard for early modern representation of anatomical
knowledge—were of course informed by direct observation of the body and demonstration of its
workings via dissection; arguably, these illustrations themselves constituted printed dissections.
In fact, they can even be seen as constituting “nothing less than a demand for an anatomical
understanding of the human body based on observation and dissection of human bodies,” as
historian Vivian Nutton has argued (LXXXV).
It seems then that when Descartes’s critics dismissed his claims about the distinction of
mind and body due to a lack of demonstration, they reflected this early modern conviction that
proper anatomy demands direct observation of the body. Notably, Descartes vehemently
disagrees with the criticism that his anatomy is not properly demonstrated, and frames
Meditations as a collection of arguments which will achieve “such a level of lucidity that …
[they] ought to be regarded as the most precise of demonstrations” (49). Here, instead of alluding
to the possible validation of his theories via experiment (Descartes was in many ways an
experimental philosopher, including in anatomical science), Descartes explicitly claims that his
writing alone will suffice as a demonstration. However, as neurobiology researcher André Parent
puts it in a 2019 article, the systematic dissection method anatomia sensibilis “emphasizes …
sensory over textual versions of the truth” (“Berengario” 1). In some ways, Descartes’s
insistence that the body is wholly distinct and separable from the mind—as it exists only in his
writing and can not be demonstrated on a dissection table—feels like a textual rather than
sensory anatomy. By opening Voyage with an insinuation that the ensuing text will include more
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proof than can be found in Descartes’s work, it feels implied that the fiction’s explorations of and
assertions about the mind and body will better meet the period’s standards for anatomical
knowledge by providing a level of evidence—perhaps even anatomia sensibilis—that cannot be
found in a philosophical treatise alone.
Through its imaginative depiction of disembodied souls, Voyage does transcend the
possibilities available in reality for the demonstration of dualism; it is worth briefly noting that
the fact that the fiction imagines what Cartesian dualism would look like in action by creating
Cartesian characters who can detach their souls from their bodies starts to make Daniel’s creative
“demonstration” of dualism seem more like tribute than criticism.6 However, as I will show, the
narrator’s direct interactions with disembodied souls (including his own) reveal flaws in the
fictional Cartesians’ assertions about the soul-body relationship, including the assertion that the
Cartesians’s selves can be fully constituted without their bodies. Nevertheless, because, with
Voyage, Daniel himself uses text as a vehicle for his explorations of and convictions about the
soul and body through the experiences of a fictional narrator—he does not, for instance, carry
out a real-life, physical experiment that attempts to debunk Cartesian claims—his project is in
this sense no more proof-based than Descartes’s Meditations.
But, it soon becomes clear that Voyage’s narrator is determined to measure the fictional
Cartesians’ claims against the standards of proof, and it is through his eyes that the reader must
attempt to make sense of Voyage’s version of Cartesian anatomy, and it is largely because of his
first-person perspective that Voyage ultimately accomplishes a critique of Cartesianism, fictional
and real, that does seem useful—this critique frames Cartesianism as contrived and anxiously
6

Justin E.H. Smith makes a similar claim in his 2019 essay, “Gabriel Daniel: Descartes Through the Mirror of
Fiction.” Smith argues that because events that take place in Voyage depend to an extent on models that were a “part
of Descartes’s great legacy,” and because the text contains “accurate reflection[s] of some of the most important
implications of Descartes’s thought …, the satire … seems at times indistinguishable from homage” (801).
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preoccupied with the need to assert itself. Throughout different passages in the story, the reader
is forced to themself be critical, and to pay attention to the competing “observations” made by
both the narrator and the Cartesians, often through direct experience, about the soul’s separation
from the body. It is ultimately the satirical dialogue the narrator has with the reader about these
problems and the Cartesians’ reactions to his questions that I argue is what makes Voyage’s satire
effective—it becomes clear that the Cartesians are not receptive to debate, which helps the text
frame Cartesian anatomy as a convenient, contrived construction that is fragilely maintained, and
the Cartesians as needing to anxiously assert their beliefs (even at the expense of productive
discourse). This reading should remind us of the real anxious underpinnings of Cartesian dualism
and the machine metaphor which emerged in part out of an urgent need to establish humanity’s
transcendence of mechanism at a time when lifelike automata threatened our self-image. We are
reminded, through reading Voyage, that the machine metaphor was to some degree the product of
anxiety and uncertainty; once we see this, we can see how it prompts us to imagine and enact
fantasies of transcendence. In a way, Voyage embodies the takeover of Cartesian anatomy,
reminding us of its appeal even as it struggles to resist it.
Pineal Gland Controversy and the Cartesians’ Unsteady, Defensive Anatomy
In order to figure out how to manually detach his soul from his body, the fictional
Descartes performs a series of anatomical experiments designed to demonstrate and prove his
convictions about the nature of the soul-body relationship. Notably, as discussed in the previous
chapter, Descartes’s real work in anatomy and dissection was largely focused on determining “in
what place the Soul was seated,” which he determined to be the pineal gland (12). According to
one of the fictional Descartes’s disciples, described simply as “the old Gentleman,” Descartes
does the same thing—confirms via anatomical experiment that the soul is “not extended through
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the whole Body,” and in fact “[keeps] her Court no where but in the Brain”—specifically, in the
pineal gland (10). The real Descartes’s theories about the pineal gland contributed greatly to the
broader Cartesian view of the body as a a machine. In his final philosophical treatise, The
Passions of the Soul (1649), Descartes designates the pineal gland as the anatomical/material seat
of the rational soul, and the interface between it and the body (Lokhorst). As neuroscience
historians Francisco López-Muñoz and Cecilio Alamo put it in a 2010 essay, Descartes believed
that from its position in the pineal gland, the soul “supervised the communication between the
human machine and its surroundings and acted as an internal influence that exerted control over
the precise functioning of the human body” (López-Muñoz and Alamo, 449). It is clear that this
pineal gland theory, then, contributed greatly to the machine metaphor, and to the
conceptualization of the body as a kind of static mechanism until activated into motion by the
volition of the soul and the subsequent movement of the gland.
Moments in Voyage quickly begin to suggest that the Cartesian pineal gland theory is
part of a contrived and false anatomy of the body. In one section, the narrator tells the reader that
he agrees with the perspective of an anatomist who views the fictional Descartes as “the
ingenious Contriver of a Novel Man” (52). This is, arguably, a label befitting a kind of inventor;
it is as if the fictional Descartes has imagined and then constructed a new and unfamiliar image
of man—not unlike the architects of the moving statues at the St. Germain-en-Laye gardens.
Like these statues, the fictional Descartes’s “Novel Man” is also framed as a strange imposter, or
false imitator of nature: the narrator explains that the anatomist he refers to also “shew’d and
prov’d by ocular Demonstration, this Man of [Descartes’s] a quite Different Creature from that
which God Created” (52). The implications of this declaration are manifold—it further conceives
of the Cartesian “Man” as contrived and unnatural, and is also the first of numerous times the
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text inadvertently requires the reader to weigh the merits of conflicting observations by
characters about the body, which are all presented as definitive proof or demonstration. For the
fictional Descartes’s part, it appears at first that he has arrived at his conclusions about the pineal
gland in an authoritative, precise, and ultimately irrefutable manner. The old Gentleman explains
to the narrator that
M. Descartes thoroughly examin’d the different Opinions of Philosophers and Physicians
thereupon, and after having solidly confuted the greatest part of their Sentiments, that
were founded upon but weak and unsound Principles, evidently concludes, The set of the
Soul must have three Conditions: First, it must be one; … Secondly, it must be very near
the Source of the Animal Spirits; … And in the third Place, it must be Moveable; …
Conditions no where to be met but in a little Gland call’d Pineale or Conarium (12-13).
Here, the fictional Descartes’s anatomical knowledge seems to meet the conditions of the
creation of a credible early modern anatomy—he determines his anatomical structure
procedurally, by empirically determining whether the pineal gland can physically serve the soul’s
functions, as well as precisely, by detailing the parts surrounding and supporting the pineal
gland. These are the markers of a conclusive demonstration of anatomical theory. It seems all the
more damning for the fictional Cartesians then, when the narrator recalls (not aloud, but to the
reader), the conclusions of a “M. Stenon the great Anatomist,” telling us that has become
convinced of the truth of Stenon’s experiments, which demonstrated that
the pineal Gland has not the Situation, much less is capable of those Motions attributed to
it, upon [Descartes’s] Hypothesis, [and] that the Vessels with which it is encompassed,
are not Arteries, which might supply it with the Matter of the Animal Spirits, as M.
Descartes supposes; but only Veins, [and] that by consequence the Honour and Privilege
it has given it, of being the Closet of the Soul, is without Foundation; and that perhaps it
deserves not to be advanced … above the other Glands (52-3).
At this point, we may begin to wonder how the fictional Cartesians have managed to escape such
damning evidence and build such a powerful influence despite it. The narrator tells us that he
purposefully decides not to challenge the opinions of the Cartesians out loud, saying, “These
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were my Thoughts, though I kept them to my self; and I was desirous, as much as possible, to
accompany them in their Sentiments” (54). Here, we get the sense that the narrator, in order to
remain trusted by the Cartesians so that he can—as he says in the opening passages in the
story—“dive to the bottom of Descartes’s Philosophy” (7), passively goes along with the
assertions and beliefs of the Cartesians. It is, arguably, also implied by the fact that our narrator
chooses to stay silent that these fictional Cartesians may not react well to the suggestion that they
and Descartes are wrong about the pineal gland. Here, then, there seems to be an indication that
the success of the Cartesian anatomy is upheld through stubborn conviction rather than through
open dialogue.
It is worth clarifying that the fact that Voyage’s narrator calls Descartes’s pineal gland
theory into question is not particularly consequential in and of itself. Only a small number of
thinkers accepted Descartes’s notions about the pineal gland during his lifetime, and his theories
were almost universally rejected after his death (Lokhorst). Notably, it seems likely that the
anatomist character that the narrator cites, “M. Stenon,” refers to Danish anatomist and Catholic
bishop Niels Steensen (1638-1686), given that he is cited by multiple seventeenth-century
anatomical texts in the Early English Books Online database as “Stenon” or “Nicholas Stenon.”7
Steensen was one of the main anatomists in the seventeenth century to criticize and ultimately
disprove Descartes’s assertions about the pineal gland. Since Cartesian views about the pineal
gland were already generally invalidated by Steensen and others prior to Voyage’s publication in
1690, the fact that Daniel’s character creates doubt about these views does not make for
particularly interesting or successful satire. Nevertheless, it is the comic way the narrator informs

7

Citers of Stenon include Dutch anatomist Regnier de Graaf (1641-1673) and English anatomists Thomas Willis
(1621-1675) and Nehemia Grew (1641-1712). Stenon is referred to by today’s scholars under numerous other
latinized or anglicized variations of his name, including Nicolaus, Nicolas, or Nicholas Steno, Niels or Nicolas
Stenson, and Niels Stensen.
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us that he will not be bringing up his doubts to the Cartesians that feels effective. This is even
more true if we consider how the stability or resonance of the machine metaphor may be at stake
in Stenon’s criticism and therefore in the narrator’s reference to it. We might compare the
fictional Stenon’s opinion that “perhaps [the pineal gland] deserves not to be advanced … above
the other Glands” to a question the real Steensen asked his audience in a 1673 speech he made at
the Domus Anatomica, an anatomy theater that existed in Copenhagen in the years 1644-1728:
“what beauties would we see, … if we contemplated the entire structure of the body, if we gazed
upon the soul which so many and so ingeniously constructed instruments obey?” (Steno 857).
Here, the pineal gland is not “advanced” above other parts, to use the language attributed to the
fictional Stenon—importance is placed instead on the numerous bodily “instruments” which
Steensen suggests are controlled by the soul.8 This is an image of a soul that is extended beyond
the pineal gland alone; though this image still frames the body as a kind of mechanism directed
by the soul, it arguably depicts the body as a more unified and holistic entity than the pineal
gland theory does. The narrator’s citing of Stenon may indicate a subtle resistance to the
Cartesian machine metaphor.9 It is more interesting then that the narrator withholds his doubt
about the pineal gland—the narrator is doubting fundamental components of Descartes’s
machine model of the body, based on authoritative anatomical knowledge, but is careful to avoid
telling this to the fictional Cartesians, indirectly portraying them as intolerant to opposition.

8

Some scholars have cited Dutch anatomist Isbrand van Diemerbroeck (1609-1674)’s Anatome Corporis Humani
(1672) as the last anatomy textbook to discuss the soul as part of a routine description of the human body and its
parts. After this, following the broader Cartesian and scientific turn, “the soul disappeared from the scope of
anatomy,” as George W. Corner, M.D. writes in a 1919 essay appearing in the second volume of Annals of Medical
History (1920). It is therefore worth noting that Steensen’s discussion of the soul here in 1673 occurred right at the
point of this transition.
9

It is important to note that there are moments in Voyage when the narrator’s testimony to some extent paradoxically
corroborates the Cartesian machine metaphor, positioning Voyage again as a text that tows the line between criticism
and homage. For example, once he successfully detaches his soul from his body, he confirms that all his body’s
motions “were performed … only by their Dependance on the Disposition of the Machine” (54).
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This portrayal solidifies when the narrator decides to withhold even the most
authoritative invalidation of their anatomy—his direct experience with his own pineal gland.
Crucially, the narrator in the first place becomes convinced of the truth of M. Stenon’s refutation
of the pineal gland theory when he experiences soul-body detachment after gaining the
Cartesians’ trust and learning about the process under their guidance. In a sly moment when the
narrator addresses the reader, he tells us that as he experiences his own disembodiment for the
first time, he is able to firsthand see where his Soul resides—not in the pineal gland (52). In this
case, the Cartesian pineal gland theory is undermined not just through allusions to outside
knowledge, but is contradicted through the experience of the narrator himself, which arguably
could not be more direct—it goes beyond the bounds of real-life anatomical experiment,
allowing him to sort of look inside himself as a disembodied soul. By this point, Voyage has
established that the fictional Cartesians, like the real Descartes, deeply value and are committed
to empirical knowledge; for example, in an early passage, the old Gentleman tells the narrator
that it was “[Descartes’s] way (as all know) to endeavor to make good by Experience, the Truths
he had discover’d by the meer Light of his Understanding” (9). In fact, earlier in the story, the
old Gentleman told the narrator that, following his principles of empiricism, Descartes does in
fact directly confirm his pineal gland theory when, during how own first experience with
disembodiment, he supposedly “see[s] [his soul] advanc’d upon the Pineal Gland” (17). It is
jarring then, when the narrator forces the reader to confront these two opposing experiences—at
this point, we might wonder what would happen if the Cartesians were told about what the
narrator saw, especially given their commitment to empirical knowledge. However, we never

Simeone 47
find out, because once again, the narrator chooses not to tell the old Gentleman or Father
Mersennus,10 one of the fictional Descartes’s colleagues, about his observation:
For the first thing my Gentleman would persuade me, whether I would or not, was, that
my Soul in the instant of Separation, saw herself seated on the pineal Gland. As I judged
it unfitting to begin with them by a palpable Contradiction; I made an answer, That the
Separation was performed heedlessly, I had no Time to make that Observation, What I
said was true, and was also the least disobliging Answer I could find (52).
This moment solidifies these passages’ depiction of the Cartesians’ anatomy—particularly, of the
pineal gland—as carefully contrived, and shakily maintained. That the narrator describes the old
Gentleman as desiring to “persuade” him of the pineal gland theory arguably indicates a
potentially anxious need to convince which would likely not be felt by the transmitter of a truly
irrefutable anatomy. There is also the narrator’s calculated resolution to not be “disobliging,”
which frames the Cartesians’ theory as something that is expected to be complied with, and the
Cartesians as prone to feel affronted if they are contradicted. It seems implied then that the
narrator’s decision to not contradict the Cartesians is a courtesy—he is comically aware of their
fragility, and chooses not to offend. This situation suggests of course that there are truths outside
of the Cartesian model, and that the Cartesians are lucky they are not confronted with them, and
are allowed to remain in their insular, constructed reality. This reflection is reminiscent of a
moment earlier on in the text, when the narrator, criticizing the Cartesians’ unbounded allegiance
to Descartes, asks the old Gentleman—about followers of alternative philosophies—“if their
Reason hath discover’d to them another Path than what M. Descartes trod in, why are you angry
if they follow it?” (6); the old Gentleman’s response that the reason is because “Truth and
Reason are manifestly on [Descartes’s] side” (7) comes off lazy in comparison, or, at least, easy.
Ultimately, if we choose to believe (within the context of the fiction) the narrator’s firsthand
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was a close friend of Descartes’s and who shared many of his philosophical opinions.
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knowledge of the pineal gland, then we must accept that the fictional Descartes (and his
followers) so anxiously clung to and maybe even arrogantly insisted on the pineal gland theory
that the reality of it was obscured, despite even empirical observation.
Though, as mentioned above, Voyage’s challenges to the pineal gland theory are not
particularly impactful in and of themselves, the resulting portrayal of the fictional Cartesians as
the propagators of a contrived, fragile, and anxiously maintained anatomy does do something
useful as a satirical critique—it reminds us of the real conditions of the Cartesian
anatomy/machine metaphor’s creation, inadvertently showing us what potential there may be in
critically examining Cartesian notions of the body as contrived and nervous. The passages
explored in this section depict the pineal gland theory as empirically doubtful, and the Cartesians
as avoiding this reality through a nervous and possibly even hostile intolerance to opposing
perspectives. Notably, Niels Steensen’s real criticisms of Decartes’s pineal gland theory seem to
suggest that the conception of the theory was the result of an uncharacteristic lapse in Descartes’s
empirical method—Steensen proves that the theory was based on incorrect anatomical data, and
blamed Descartes “for not having applied his own method to the study of the brain” (Parent,
“Niels Stensen,” 486). Perhaps, then, there was also a hastiness to the real formation of the
Cartesian pineal gland theory—a need to locate the material seat of the soul in order to justify its
relationship to the machine of the body. This reflection should remind us that Descartes wrote
about the seat of the soul almost in the presence of the humanlike automata of Europe, which
directly threatened previous conceptions of the human body as being deeply unified with the
rational soul. There was an urgency that the disorienting unfamiliarity of the automata
engendered—such novel and strange constructions themselves felt like proof that the body could
not be what defines the human, and there was of course a subsequent motivation to assert our
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transcendence of bodily mechanism. Perhaps Cartesian anatomy did not need to be as rigorous
about its empiricism as would otherwise be expected. The image of Cartesian anatomy as
impatiently needing to assert itself reminds us again that the machine model of the body was in
some ways a product of anxiety about the body and its relationship to mechanism. Considering
this may compel us to reexamine our notions of mind and body today, and question the extent to
which today’s emerging technologies—like the automata of seventeenth-century
Europe—require us to grasp at ways to assert our difference from machines.
The Cartesians’ Confused Disembodiment
It is worth first briefly exploring how Voyage not only paints Cartesian anatomy as
contrived and uncertain through its discussions of the pineal gland, but also through scenes in
which characters negotiate the characteristics of disembodied souls—specifically, the text
satirically indicates that even the Cartesians themselves cannot quite escape embodiment and its
importance for defining the self. In Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes emphasizes his
conviction that the body is effectively meaningless in constituting the self, claiming that full
knowledge and constitution of the soul is possible without the body:
This “I,” that is to say, the soul through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from
the body and is even easier to know than the body, and even if there were no body at all,
it would not cease to be at all that it is (19).
Of course, a key premise behind the motivation of Voyage’s fictional Cartesians to detach their
souls from their bodies is this same conviction. However, the experience of the narrator calls into
question the extent to which the Cartesians’ disembodied souls corroborate this belief that the
self does not need a body to be whole. In one scene, the narrator interacts with two separated
(disembodied) souls—Father Mersennus’s and the old Gentleman’s—that nevertheless appear to
him to have bodies. He tells the two souls:
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It is not many days since I read in M. Descartes, That the Essence of the Soul consists in
being a thinking Substance, and that she hath neither Extension, nor Figure, nor Colour;
which I know not how to reconcile with what I see at present: For you give me to
understand, you be purely Spirits, yet I perceive in you different Colours, and I see you
form’d in the Figure of a Man, and you look like Beings that are extended (39).
In response to the narrator’s confusion, Father Mersennus provides a comically far-fetched
“explanation” for what he sees. He starts by telling the narrator, “though we seem to have a Face,
and Hands, and Feet; yet we have neither Face, nor Hands, nor Feet” (39). He continues,
explaining that he is manipulating the narrator’s “Optick Nerve, to … [cause] [him] to see a
Body, when in truth there is none to see” (41). Though distrust of the senses was a real,
foundational quality of Descartes’s anatomical philosophy (only the immaterial thinking faculty
of the mind can truly be trusted), this is obviously an exaggerated version. It does seem like the
Cartesians, as disembodied souls, exert a fair amount of effort to appear in physical forms—they
are somehow capable of carefully and precisely manipulating an onlooker’s optic nerve to create
a perfect illusion. That the fictional Cartesians go to these lengths to appear to others in physical
forms suggests that despite their convictions about the body’s irrelevance to the soul, they cannot
quite move beyond embodiment. If the Cartesians do in fact go to these lengths to appear to have
bodies, it seems that even they cannot fully justify or operate in a world where bodies are
untethered from the self.
The narrator continues to call into question the fictional Cartesians’ ability to fully
constitute themselves without their bodies when he inquires about the gender identities of the
disembodied souls. The narrator asks Mersennus what names and titles disembodied souls ought
to assign each other; because souls are, in French, gendered feminine, he says, it seems wrong to
call Descartes’s soul “Monsieur,” but “Madam” or “Mademoiselle” seems equally wrong (54). In
response, Mersennus tells the narrator not to worry about this, explaining, “we continue the same
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Names we had in the World when in our Bodies … for what’s a Man? He’s a Soul that makes use
of a Body” (55). He also quotes Descartes’s claim from Discourse on Method that the self is an
entity wholly distinct from the body. It seems like Daniel is satirically calling attention to a
contradiction here—theoretically, under the Cartesian maxim that we (our selves) are truly
distinct from our bodies, disembodied souls should not necessarily retain their genders. So,
Mersennus’s matter-of-fact statement that disembodied souls naturally continue using the same
titles as when they were embodied places a hard-to-ignore significance on the body for the self
and identity. By explaining that disembodied souls retain their embodied genders, Mersennus
paradoxically indicates that the body very much matters to the soul’s constitution. With both his
“embodied” and gendered souls, Daniel continues to depict Cartesian anatomy as contrived and
confused. The souls in Voyage claim to be entirely distinct from their bodies, but these passages
suggest that they are still in some ways inescapably tethered to their former bodily selves. By
doing so, not only do they suggest that understanding what the soul is without the body is a more
elusive project than Cartesians indicate, but they also once again situate the formation of
Cartesian anatomy within an architecture of confusion and instability. Like the pineal gland
passages discussed in the previous section, these passages thereby signal the utility of a critique
that examines the machine model of the body as a product of radical, disruptive change in the
way we are forced to see ourselves.
Transcending the Body and Evading Death
So far, I have argued that the primary success of Voyage’s satirical critique of
Cartesianism is in its framing of it as contrived, confused, and anxiously maintained—it does this
by challenging the authority of the fictional Cartesians’s claims about the pineal gland and about
the soul’s distinction from the body, and simultaneously depicting the Cartesians as comically
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insular and resistant to opposition. Both depictions suggest the utility of a critique of Cartesian
anatomy and the machine metaphor that centers the ways in which anxiety, uncertainty, and
radical novelty have shaped (and continue to shape) their creation and influence. In this section, I
will focus on how Voyage inadvertently highlights the Cartesian fixation on the transcendence of
mechanism that this anxiety, uncertainty, and novelty led to by exploring the fiction’s depiction
of how disembodiment allows its Cartesian characters to essentially evade death. This reading
solidifies the Voyage’s memorableness as a text which is ultimately a seventeenth-century
manifestation of some of the key implications of the machine metaphor’s legacy: Daniel’s fiction
indirectly demonstrates the hold the machine model had over the fictional (and real) Cartesians,
who, in order to transcend it, transport themselves beyond their bodies.
As has been alluded to so far, in Voyage, once Descartes and his followers discover that
the rational soul can be separated from the body, Cartesians travel the world and the cosmos as
disembodied souls. As traveling disembodied souls, all of the fictional Cartesians could arguably
be said to have evaded death, to some extent—they are able to travel beyond the bounds of their
bodies and the Earth while their bodies are still functional. However, as the result of absurd
accidents, the soul-body separation in the story offers an even more direct loophole: when bodies
become inhabitable (are no longer fit to house the soul), their disembodied souls are forced to
wander eternally. Though this latter situation is depicted to some extent as an undesirable glitch,
the text mostly portrays both temporary and permanent disembodiment as desirable fantasies that
the Cartesians, and only them, get to enact and indulge in.
Part of how the text does this is by depicting Cartesian anatomical knowledge about the
soul-body relationship as private, secret knowledge; in Voyage, only Descartes’s most loyal
followers are made aware of his most significant anatomical discovery—the process for
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manually separating the rational soul from the body. Language in the text supports the idea that
the discovery about separation is the fictional Descartes’s highest end and greatest achievement:
when the fictional Descartes informs the old Gentleman of his breakthrough, he tells him “I have
found out the Secret, not only of the Union of the Soul and Body, but also how to separate them
when I please” (16).11 It is significant then, that the fictional Descartes decides to withhold this
knowledge from public dissemination. As Justin E.H. Smith puts it, Cartesianism in the fiction is
framed as “a sort of mystery cult, which reveals its true secrets only to select initiates” (Smith,
796). Notably, early modern anatomists generally emphasized the importance of dissemination
and utility, shaping them into “living embodiment[s] of a … regime in which knowledge was to
be made publicly available for the benefit of all” (64). This is of course the opposite of the
approach the fictional Descartes takes to hide his knowledge from most. In fact, knowledge
about disembodiment is restricted to only Descartes’s most loyal followers: the old Gentleman
recalls what Descartes said to him when he first made his discovery:
It is the most curious Secret in the World. I am resolv’d to commit it but to very few; but
that Adherency which you have manifested until this time unto me, will not suffer me to
be reserv’d in any thing (16).
The old Gentleman then tells the narrator that “[Descartes] went on, without giving me time to
compliment his Generosity” (16). Here, the fact that the fictional Descartes is depicted as being
generous for revealing his discovery to only his most loyal followers (those who show the most
“Adherency”) fashions Cartesian anatomy into a kind of indulgence that the Cartesians are lucky
enough to experience.
Part of this is achieved by the text’s descriptions of the process of manual soul-body
separation that read more like descriptions of a magical dream than like real science. When the
old Gentleman recalls for the narrator the moment he first witnessed Descartes undergo the
11

Emphasis in italics is my own.
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separation process, he says that he “durst have swore at that moment, there had been no small
Conjuring in the Business of our Philosopher” (15). The method of the fictional Descartes’s
soul-body separation requires him to inhale tobacco snuff mixed with an unidentified herb,
putting the body in a trance and loosening the soul from it; to re-enter the body, the disembodied
soul brings a bottle of “Hungary Water” under the body’s nose, jolting the senses and allowing
itself to re-enter the body. In explaining this process, the old Gentleman recounts a scene that
reads like a dream: he describes how he watched Descartes’s soul (which was invisible to him at
the time) “[take] the bottle, … and [bring] it in the Air from the far Side of the Chamber to his
Body” (22). This does not read like the description of a serious anatomical experiment, and more
like the work of a magician.
When it becomes clear that the Cartesians in Voyage can redefine the parameters of death
using Descartes’s knowledge, Cartesian anatomy seems all the more self-serving and indulgent.
At this point, we might recall the language used by Descartes when he first tells the old
Gentleman of his success—he says, “I have found out the Secret, not only of the Union of the
Soul and Body, but also how to separate them when I please” (16). The “when I please” clause is
significant—Cartesian anatomical discovery has figured out how to separate or reunite soul and
body at will, enabling the Cartesians to truly indulge in their discovery, by detaching from their
bodies spontaneously and frequently. This ability reaches a new height when, after an accident,
Descartes’s disembodiment allows him to intervene in and redefine what would otherwise have
been his death. Voyage’s narrator introduces the topic of death when he wonders how Descartes
came to die at the age of fifty four, asking the old Gentleman, “Was he so much out of Love with
his Life as to neglect the repairing those effluxes of his Machine?” (24). To this question, the old
Gentleman comically responds, “Do you believe then … that M. Descartes is dead?” (24). The
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narrator is stunned, and explains why it seems that, without a doubt, Descartes must in fact be
dead—because his body has perished, and been buried:
I know not, … how you understand it, but methinks the Corps of a Man should not be
buried unless he was dead before; and all the World knows that in the Year 1650, the
Body of M. Descartes was interred at Stockholm with great Pomp and Solemnity … It
seems to me once more, That all this supposes a Man as dead as dead can be (25).
The old Gentleman responds, explaining that because Descartes’s “death” did not follow the
natural laws of the universe, he cannot truly be considered dead:
All these particulars are true, … but for all that it is false that M. Descartes is dead; for
that we call Death is when our Body becoming incapable of Vital Functions, … the Soul
is oblig’d to quit her Habitation, following the Laws of their Union establish’d by the
Sovereign Master of the Universe: But Cartesius’s Soul was by no means separated from
his Body after this manner (25).
The old Gentleman then describes what really happened to Descartes’s body and soul, not long
after he first makes his discovery about disembodiment. He explains that while Descartes’s soul
was out traveling the world, his body is of course left behind. Normally, as mentioned, to
conclude the body’s trance and startle the soul back into the body, the soul administers “Hungary
Water” to the body. While Descartes’s soul is out traveling, a physician visits and, seeing a body
lying on a bed and not waking up, tries to wake it with a “liquor” that is stronger than the
Hungary Water, which causes the body to wake from its trance, open its eyes, let out a few
groans, and respond to some basic questions. However, because in true Cartesian fashion the
“Soul was not there to talk rationally, … the Answers were full of Extravagance and Delirium”
(26); concerned by this, the physician applies several violent remedies to Descartes’s body,
which “so exhausted and altered … [it], that in a short Time … it [becomes] a meer Cadaver, …
unable to perform the Duties of Life, and to Receive his Soul” (27). Descartes’s soul thus
becomes fated to wander eternally around the Earth and other worlds in the heavens, where other
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disembodied souls of Cartesians also travel, and is ultimately not considered “dead” by the old
Gentleman.
It does seem like the fictional Descartes should be considered dead by the definition
given by the old Gentleman earlier—his body has become inhabitable, and his soul has thus been
obliged to leave it permanently. The crucial difference seems to be that this did not occur under
neutral laws—Descartes’s soul and body were separated in “life,” while the body was still
habitable; this is antithetical to the Christian definition of death (which, by Voyage’s publication,
was a very old one), under which the soul becomes separated only once the body has become
inhabitable. It seems that death in this commonly accepted sense has thus been precluded from
happening by the fictional Descartes’s body-soul separation; it is almost like some sort of
glitch—Descartes is alive when he should be dead, or, in other words, alive under the conditions
of death.
Daniel has thus pictured a Cartesian anatomy whereby Descartes and his followers—if
their bodies become inhospitable, like Descartes’s—are able to cheat death and the laws of
nature, or at least claim that death does not apply to their situations. At the least, this depiction
portrays Cartesian anatomy as more than just absurd, and also as a construction which has
enabled the ultimate self-serving indulgence—the ability to circumvent our bodies and the laws
of nature.12 The text also implies that this situation is a very positive one for the Cartesians. For
one, upon becoming permanently dislodged from his body, Descartes embarks on a prolonged
journey to other planets to explore and eventually create a world according to his design (Smith
796). In addition, at one point, Descartes’s disembodied soul even tells the old Gentleman that

12

At the worst, this is also a depiction of an extremely arrogant anatomy: if there is no death—if Cartesians can say
that someone is alive even in what very much appears to be death—then, arguably, life itself suddenly becomes
trivial and meaningless. In this view, Cartesianism so arrogantly thinks it has the power to reshape our most
fundamental notions of life and death.
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she “found herself incomparably better out, than in the Body” (30).13 It seems, then, that
disembodied souls in Voyage are eagerly detached from the body, able to find significant
meaning once separated from the body. Ultimately, Daniel’s depiction of Cartsian anatomy as a
contrived way to get around death once again highlights a useful critical understanding of the
machine metaphor—one which invites us to notice how the Cartesian fixation on the distinction
between soul/mind and body, strengthened by a desire to transcend our ties to mechanism, may
encourage us to pursue radical fantasies of disembodiment.

13

This statement is of course reminiscent of the Platonic corporeal prison model discussed in the previous chapter,
which Descartes’s machine metaphor was influenced by and expanded on.
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Epilogue
This project has traced the gradual arc from the emergence of anatomical science and its
appreciation of both the body and mind in the early to mid-seventeenth century, to the arrival of
the Cartesian machine metaphor in the later part of the century, which separated body from mind,
no longer accepting the body as a crucial marker of selfhood or humanity. Phineas Fletcher’s The
Purple Island straddles the turning point between these two developments, creating—through an
effective dissective poetry—a vision of the human being as both fragmented and whole, and
ultimately as the masterful result of a unified mind-body relationship. Gabriel Daniel’s A Voyage
to the World of Cartesius writes decades after the turn, and ultimately reveals—through a
captivating satirical fiction—how understanding Cartesian anatomy as the product of anxiety,
uncertainty, and novelty helps us better see how we became motivated to transcend our bodies
and the mechanistic view of ourselves.
Where Chapter Two leaves off—with the dominance of the Cartesian machine metaphor
and the desire to escape our bodies—provides the opportunity to reflect briefly on the impact of
this dominance on twentieth and twenty-first century culture, and the questions that, like Fletcher
and Daniel, we are now asking ourselves about our bodies and minds. Like these authors, we are
engaged now in imaginative projects that reflect a pressure to redefine ourselves in the face of
radical change—particularly, technological change in the field of artificial intelligence
(AI)—which threatens to disrupt our existing understandings about what makes us human.
The universe-wandering disembodied Cartesian souls in some ways feels like a satire not
just of these characters, but also of those of us today in 2022 who, for example, imagine what it
might be like to achieve immortality via whole brain emulation or in other words, by uploading
our minds to the digital realm. This is, at the moment, more of a science fiction resembling
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Daniel’s disembodied souls than it is a realistic goal; however, its progress in recent years
suggests a Cartesian-esque willingness and desire to discard and transcend our bodies and
mortality, and to become constituted only by our minds. In the 2020 book, AI Narratives: A
History of Imaginative Thinking about Intelligent Machines, philosopher Steven Cave writes
about the idea that we might transfer our minds to a “more durable substrate” under a subheading
titled, “Mind Uploading: The Promise of Technological Transcendence” (314). Cave notes that
such fantasies of immortality and transcendence via technology have been advocated since 1982
by numerous figures in the AI field, and notes that Descartes’s dualism was a turning point in
“making the dream of digital immortality possible,” because of its conception of the body as a
burden to the mind and of the possibility that the mind could be freed from it (314-15).
Present-day fantasies (and fears) about mind uploading reflect the persisting dominance of
Cartesian ways of viewing ourselves, with the additional implication that our minds themselves
have become equated with mechanism/computation (if they can, in fact, be uploaded like
software to a digital substrate). In this imaginative project, the body seems like the farthest thing
from our thoughts.
Conversely, the AI field has seen a recent growth in efforts related to “Embodied AI,” or
“biologically-constrained AI.” Neuroscientist and tech entrepreneur Jeff Hawkins has been
leading a slowly-growing movement to develop AI that is inspired in a highly detailed way by
the human brain. Hawkins has argued that we should build AI that is created with the recognition
that our embodiment—our senses, our movement, etc.—is crucial to how we learn and
experience the world (Heaven, 2021). Hawkins’s view arguably asks us to consider a less
abstracted understanding of human intelligence—our own minds—in order to contemplate how
our embodiment and existence as biological entities shapes who we are.
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Perhaps, if we are skeptical of fantasies of transcendence of the human body—either by
ourselves as we upload our minds, or by AI that is created in its image—we should follow
behind Fletcher and Daniel, imagining various anatomies in motion, and possibly arriving at a
better understanding of why we imagine what we do.
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